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EIGHT IS ENOUGH 
Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins* 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 26, 2009, the nation‘s second set of live-born octuplets was 
delivered at a California hospital.1  The public fascination with this unusual 
event quickly turned ugly when the media revealed that the new mother was 
thirty-three-year-old Nadya Suleman, a single, unemployed woman already 
caring for six other children under the age of eight.  As Ellen Goodman of 
the Boston Globe described it, upon discovery of Suleman‘s identity, the 
mood of the country went ―from ‗Gee whiz‘ to ‗Are you kidding?‘‖ in a 
matter of days.2 
The reaction to Nadya Suleman‘s new family stands in stark contrast to 
the enthusiastic reception for many other families with high-order mul-
tiples.  For example, the cable show Jon & Kate Plus 8, which features a 
family with a set of sextuplets and a set of twins, is currently one of cable 
television‘s highest-rated shows.3  The McCaughey septuplets, born in 
1997, are similarly famous: for example, they celebrate their birthdays each 
year with Dateline reporter Ann Curry.4  Indeed, public fascination with 
high-birth families dates back at least to the famous Dionne quintuplets of 





  Naomi Cahn is John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington University 
Law School.  Jennifer Collins is Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.  Our thanks go to 
Clare Huntington and Adam Charnes for their very helpful comments.  We would also like to thank Rich 
McPherson for invaluable research assistance. 
1
  Remarkably, the doctors were surprised by the arrival of octuplets; they had only been expecting 
to deliver seven babies.  CNN, Octuplets’ Births Surprise California Doctors, CNNHEALTH.COM, Jan. 
27, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/01/26/california.octuplets/ (link). 
2




  See Susan Stewart, Big Brood Spawns Big Ratings, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/arts/television/15stew.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=octuplets+stewart&s
t=nyt (link).   
4
  See, e.g., Ann Curry, Eight is Great for the McCaughey Septuplets, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 15, 2006, 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/10867824/ (describing Curry‘s visit to the children for their eighth birth-
day) (link); Ann Curry, After Ten Years, New Adventures for Septuplets, Dec. 12, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22223331/ (link).   
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ment and who were visited by more than three million people over a ten-
year span.5 
Compare the reactions to Nadya Suleman‘s story.  The medical direc-
tor of the Center for Human Reproduction termed the births a ―medical ca-
tastrophe.‖6  A columnist for the Los Angeles Times called her story 
―grotesque‖ and ―bizarre,‖ and criticized her ―manifest irresponsibility.‖7  A 
San Francisco writer deemed her ―misguided and clearly troubled.‖8  Even 
her own parents vehemently criticized Suleman; her father called her ―‗ab-
solutely irresponsible[]‘‖ and questioned her mental stability,9 while 
Nadya‘s mother described her actions as ―‗unconscionable.‘‖10   
The cultural backlash against Suleman has focused on three separate 
but related issues.  The first set of concerns revolves around Suleman her-
selfspecifically, her ability to parent fourteen young children.  Disclo-
sures about Suleman‘s background came fast and furious after the 
children‘s birth: she is single, she is unemployed, she has been receiving 
disability payments for several years, at least two of her older children re-
ceive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments and thus may have 
some kind of special needs, and while undergoing her most recent fertility 
treatment, she lived with her parents in a three-bedroom house that may be 
going into foreclosure.11  Judgments about her race, explicitly acknowl-
edged or not, may also be a factor.12  Her defenders see these criticisms 
against Suleman as a form of ―mother-blaming.‖13   
A second set of concerns revolves around the medical procedures that 
led to the octuplets‘ birth.  The fertility clinic that treated Suleman agreed to 





  See The Dionne Quintuplets: A Depression-Era Freak Show, CNN.COM, Nov. 19, 1997, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9711/19/dionne.quints/ (describing how the Canadian government removed the 
girls from their parents and housed them at ―Quintland,‖ earning the government and nearby businesses 
around a half-billion dollars in profits) (link). 
6
  Posting of Judith Graham to Triage, Doctors on the Octuplets: It’s Medical Negligence, Feb. 5, 
2009, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/triage/2009/02/doctors-on-the-octuplets-a-medical-
catastrophe.html (reporting comments of Dr. Norbert Gleicher) (link). 
7
  Tim Rutten, The Excesses of Nadya Suleman, LATIMES.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-rutten11-2009feb11,0,1768472.column (link). 
8
  Debra J. Saunders, Dysfunctional Familymaking, SFGATE.COM, Feb. 8, 2009, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/02/08/INRC15MOCA.DTL (link). 
9
  See Octuplet Grandfather to Oprah: I Question Her Mental Situation, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/19/octuplet-grandfather-to-o_n_168448.html 
(link). 
10
  See Octuplets’ Grandmother Criticizes Daughter, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29098465/ (link).   
11
  See, e.g., Rutten, supra note 7; Octuplet Grandfather to Oprah: I Question Her Mental Situation, 
supra note 9. 
12
  See Bridget J. Crawford & Lolita Buckner Innis, Multiple Anxieties: Breaching Race, Class, and 
Gender Norms with Assisted Reproduction (Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper, No. 1360453, 
Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1360453 (link). 
13
  See, e.g., id. 
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procedure.  The leading fertility industry group asserts that this decision 
was contrary to its recommended guidelines that women under the age of 
thirty-five have no more than two embryos implanted during any single IVF 
attempt.14   
A final set of issues concerns more fundamental questions about 
screening parents.  Many wonder how a clinic could agree to provide a sin-
gle mother of six with a fertility treatment that mightand diddouble her 
number of children.  This particular debate echoes larger cultural concerns 
over the changing American family, including calls for two parents (one of 
each sex) for every child. 
In response to these concerns, commentators and legislators are calling 
for new, more restrictive regulation of the fertility industry.  Shortly after 
the octuplets were born, Georgia Right to Life helped get legislation intro-
duced that would limit the number of eggs that could be fertilized in any 
IVF cycle to no more than the number that would be transferred into the 
woman.15  In Missouri, legislation was introduced to impose limits on the 
number of embryos that could be implanted.16 
Although the debate about whether and how to regulate the fertility in-
dustry is certainly not new,17 Suleman‘s story has thrown two kinds of pro-
posals into particularly sharp relief.  The first set of proposals seeks to 
increase regulation of assisted reproductive technologies (―ART‖) via the 
doctors that perform them.  For example, some commentators urge the 
United States to adopt mandatory limits on the number of embryos that can 
be implanted, as other countries have done.18  Although the American So-
ciety of Reproductive Medicine has issued guidelines regarding the appro-
priate number of embryos to transfer, adherence is entirely voluntary and, 
quite obviously, not universal.  The issues entwined with such restrictions 





  See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Guidelines on Numbers of Embryos Transferred, 90 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY S163, S163 (2008) (link).  
15
  See Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act, S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2009) (link). 
16
  See H.B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (requiring compliance with the 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine‘s recommendations on implantation) (link).  Placing limits 
on assisted reproductive technology (―ART‖) procedures can be part of a ―right to life‖ agenda because 
of beliefs that embryos are persons and that ART is morally wrong.  Accordingly, arguments for regulat-
ing ART risk alignment with an anti-abortion agenda, and must be crafted carefully.  See, e.g., William 
Saletan, Crocktuplets: Hijacking the Octuplets Backlash to Restrict IVF, SLATE, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2212876/pagenum/all/ (arguing that the chief purpose of the Georgia bill is not 
to ―help women‖ but ―to establish legal rights for embryos‖) (link). 
17
  See NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL 
REGULATION (2009); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006).  
18
  See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2008) (describing German and Italian regulatory 
schemes) (link). 
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about more meaningful regulation of the medical procedures used by the 
fertility industry.  Indeed, as we develop further below, we support several 
such initiatives.19 
We are far more troubled, however, by a second set of proposals aris-
ing out of the Suleman backlash: those that urge placing restrictions on 
which individuals may receive fertility treatment.  Margaret Somerville, 
founder of the McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics, and Law, argues that we 
should regulate access to reproductive technology in the same way that we 
regulate access to adoption.20  In her opinion, if a ―single woman with six 
children‖ and ―living with her parents‖ would not be permitted to adopt a 
child, then she should not be permitted to receive fertility treatments such as 
IVF either.21  Under this theory, women with a certain number of children, 
or with limited financial resources, should be precluded from receiving fer-
tility treatment.  Somerville also suggests that a patient‘s age, and perhaps 
her marital status, should be relevant considerations.  Some ART providers 
have already tried to impose access limitations on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.22  Indeed, many ART clinicians say they would choose to reject pa-
tients based on their marital status or sexual orientation,23 and some states 
have laws that permit the use of reproductive technology only by married 
couples.24 
Issues related to access are also weighty and difficult, but our conclu-
sion here differs from our position about regulating the medical procedures 
themselves: neither fertility clinics nor the state should be in the business of 
restricting access to reproductive technology.  We do not require financial 
litmus tests or impose limits on family size for individuals who are able to 
conceive without reproductive technology, and we do not believe that re-
quiring some medical assistance in order to conceive means that infertile 
individuals should have to tolerate such restrictions. 
Perhaps the most difficult question raised by the Suleman case and 





  We save for another piece, however, detailed answers to many questions in this area, such as is-
sues relating to how to regulate sperm, egg, and embryo donors, including both anonymous donors and 
those known to the recipient, and what to do about insurance. 
20
  See Margaret Somerville, Examining Society’s Role, OTTAWACITIZEN.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/Examining+society+role/1275699/story.html (link). 
21
  Id.  Somerville is also troubled by the case of a sixty-year-old Canadian woman who gave birth to 
twin boys after traveling to India to receive IVF treatment using donor eggs and her husband‘s sperm.  
Id. 
22
  See, e.g., N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 189 
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (ruling that a California clinic could not rely on religious objections and refuse to 
perform an intrauterine insemination procedure on a lesbian patient) (link). 
23
  See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 66 (2005); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive 
Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 54 (2008). 
24
  Oklahoma, for example, limits the use of artificial insemination to a husband and a wife.  See 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2007). 
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all in the context of ART.  Before evaluating each set of proposals in fur-
ther detail, we turn first to this threshold issue. 
I. SHOULD WE REGULATE? 
There is a powerful case to be made that the law should abstain from 
regulating ART entirely.  ART involves extraordinarily personal social and 
medical choices, and raises critical issues related to patient autonomy and 
freedom of reproductive choice.  Moreover, the cultural stigma traditionally 
associated with infertility may argue for less public attention to these issues.  
Nevertheless, we believe that some limited regulation is justifiable. 
A. Patient Autonomy 
We begin with the question of patient autonomy, the idea that individ-
uals ordinarily have the right to determine for themselves the most appro-
priate course of medical treatment.  Doctors may not, for example, treat a 
patient without her consent, and patients have a right to be informed of the 
relevant risks and benefits of any medical procedure before undergoing it.25  
But there have always been limitations to this core principle of autonomy.  
Patients do not have a right to receive medical procedures or medications 
that the Food and Drug Administration has deemed unsafe,26 and they do 
not have the right to compel others to undertake risks, such as submitting to 
bone marrow transplants, in order to further their own health agendas.  In-
deed, federal and state governments often cite the need to regulate risk in 
justifying limitations on individual autonomy.  Better-known examples of 
such limitations include mandatory vaccinations, speed limits, and seatbelt 
and helmet laws.  Autonomy has thus always been modified by risk, and we 
believe it is that principle that is relevant in the ART context. 
When a patient undergoes an ART procedure that results in high-order 
multiples, two sets of health risks are created: one to the mother and one to 
the children.  Mothers carrying high-order multiples face increased risks of 
pregnancy complications and even death.27  Children who are part of a mul-
tiple birth are far more likely to be born premature and at a low birth 
weight.  Prematurity and low birth weight are associated with higher risks 
of infant death and a host of other impairments, including ―cerebral palsy[,] 





  See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1631–32 (2008) 
(describing the implications of the principle of patient autonomy) (link). 
26
  Id. at 1632 (explaining that the FDA has ―the authority to deny access to drugs and medical de-
vices found to be unsafe or ineffective‖). 
27
  Id. at 1644 (―Some experts estimate that maternal morbidity is seven times greater in multiple 
pregnancies than in singleton deliveries and that perinatal mortality rates are four times higher for twins 
and six times higher for triplets and higher-order births.‖).  Men who intend to become fathers through 
ART do not face comparable medical risks. 
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social-emotional, health, and growth problems.‖28  Choices about the appro-
priate number of embryos to implant are therefore neither necessarily be-
nign nor neutral—they carry the very real potential for adverse 
consequences.  Importantly, these adverse consequences are not limited to 
the patient herself; rather, the ART patient‘s choices also create risk for 
third parties: the children who might be born as a result of the pregnancy at-
tempt.29  It is this potential risk to third parties, against which any potential 
children are obviously unable to defend, that seems to outweigh concerns 
for patient autonomy and to justify at least minimal government interven-
tion.  In addition to patient autonomy, however, are other values that com-
pete against the health risks to mother and children. 
B. Reproductive Choice 
The principle of freedom in matters of reproductive choice is also of 
paramount concern in discussing restrictions on ART procedures, and we 
do not believe that anything we say here should serve as a basis for retreat-
ing from that principle.  In this context, however, we believe that the sort of 
regulations we endorse below do not impinge upon the core values under-
girding reproductive freedom.  At its essence, protecting women‘s repro-
ductive freedom means that women must retain the right to decide whether 
or not they want to reproduce, and we must therefore analyze any new pro-
posed regulations to be sure they do not infringe upon this essential right.30   
Regulating the number of embryos that may be transferred during IVF 
procedures does not, of course, compel a woman to reproduce against her 
will, so that concern is not implicated by placing restrictions on ART.  But 
embryo transfer restrictions may indeed reduce the likelihood that a woman 
will be able to successfully reproduce.  This is an important and powerful 
counter-argument to ART regulation: if transferring more embryos increas-
es the chance of a successful pregnancy, then perhaps government regula-
tion should not stand in the way.  Just as personal autonomy is modulated 
by risk, however, reproductive freedom is modulated by concerns for the 
rights and freedom of others.  We do not allow individuals to become par-
ents at any cost; an individual may quite obviously not appropriate another 





  Id. 
29
  Public costs range from health care to education.  There is a generally-recognized social obliga-
tion to protect children once they come into existence.  Of course, the meaning of ―come into existence‖ 
is highly contested: Louisiana, for example, has adopted legislation recognizing that embryos are ―per-
sons,‖ and the proposed legislation in Georgia accords similar status to embryos.  See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:129 (2008) (―A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person . . . .‖) (link); Sale-
tan, supra note 16.  In arguing for the protection of future children, we are not according personhood to 
embryos; indeed, if all embryos created in an ART procedure are not transferred, embryos may need to 
be donated to another infertile patient, used for medical research, stored indefinitely, or destroyed. 
30
  See generally John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Re-
productive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1492 (2008) (arguing that ―society is accustomed to 
think of reproductive autonomy in constitutional terms as primarily a right not to reproduce‖) (link). 
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serve as a surrogate mother.  Society has always been willing to draw some 
line that it will not cross in furthering any particular individual‘s quest to 
become a parent. 
In determining where to draw that line, society should strive to protect 
an individual‘s interest in becoming a parent, while simultaneously protect-
ing society‘s interests in healthy children through appropriate market regu-
lation—regulation that will guard, for example, against power and 
informational imbalances.  Discussions about the number of embryos to be 
transferred during IVF, the amount of ART-related recordkeeping, informed 
consent requirements, and measures for keeping the market safe may poten-
tially move the United States toward this goal.  There has historically been 
comparatively little oversight of the fertility industry, so these discussions 
are long overdue.  Understanding the reasons the government has thus far 
abstained from regulation, however, will help frame future decisions. 
II. EXISTING REGULATIONS AND NEW PROPOSALS REGARDING 
MEDICAL PROCEDURES 
We turn now to a brief discussion of existing laws regulating assisted 
reproduction.  We then consider whether new regulation of the medical pro-
cedures themselves might be appropriate, before turning in the next section 
to questions regarding regulation of access to ART technology.  
A. The Current Lay of the Law 
Currently, regulation over reproductive technology by the state and 
federal government is limited.  The fertility industry mostly self regulates 
through nonbinding guidelines and suggested ethical practices, though there 
are various physician licensing requirements.31  There are numerous possi-
ble reasons for this comparative lack of oversight, including the tendency 
for scientific advances to outpace the law, the limited use of reproductive 
technology until the 1980s, and the secrecy and stigma surrounding infer-
tility.  Moreover, reproductive technology taps into deeply conflicting cul-
tural perspectives on parenthood outside of the nuclear, biological family 
and other controversial social issues,32 such as stem cell research, abortion, 
and even sex itself. 
Nevertheless, over the past several decades, the federal government has 
taken some steps toward regulationtoday, it oversees clinical laboratory 
services, drugs, and medical devices used in IVF treatments; has standards 





  For further discussion, see CAHN, supra note 17; Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the 
Line—or the Curtain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 59 (2009) (link).    
32
  See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at 
Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002) (discussing reasons for the lack of oversight); on 
cultural conflict, see NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (forthcoming 
2010). 
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provides monitoring of fertility clinic success rates to protect ART consum-
ers from fraudulent advertisements.33  Federal law does not otherwise regu-
late the medical procedures involved in donation. 
The ART industry has also engaged in some self-regulation,34 develop-
ing a series of ethical guidelines that contain advice and standards on topics 
that go beyond basic ART medical practice to include such complex issues 
as patient screening.35  Although most reproductive endocrinologists follow 
these standards, they are not, as the Suleman case so nicely illustrates, bind-
ing.  The occasional ART ―mix-ups‖ that make their way into newspapers 
or courts remind consumers and the public at large of the general lack of 
oversight.36  By contrast, many European countries take a far more restric-
tive approach, with laws primarily designed to protect embryos37 as does 
the new proposed Georgia law.  Our proposed regulations are justified in-
stead by concerns for the infertile patient and her future children, and for 
the ethical fertility doctor who does not want to transfer six embryos.38  The 
Suleman case highlights some of the most pressing areas where regulation 
is needed, such as the number of embryos transferred, the need for standar-
dized informed consent, and the role of insurance.  The case also, somewhat 
paradoxically, shows one area where we should not regulate: access to ART 
procedures.39  This Essay focuses on the embryo limit and access issues, 





  See The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to -7 
(2006) (link); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2008) (link). 
34
  See SPAR, supra note 17, at 34 (observing that ―the threat of regulation hangs heavily over the in-
dustry, prodding suppliers to conform to a fairly rigorous regime of self-regulation and often to act as if 
they were anticipating a regulatory response‖). 
35
  See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: 
ASRM Ethics Committee Reports and Statements, available at 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/ethicsmain.html (link).  On screening, see Ethics Comm. of Am. 
Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Child-rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 564 (2004). 
36
  There have been several reported cases of embryos that were wrongly implanted in the wrong 
woman.  See Leslie Bender, “To Err Is Human”: ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based, Relational Proposal, 9 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443, 446–453 (2006). 
37
  See Rao, supra note 18, at 1458–59.  Indeed, the very title of the German law makes its intent 
plain: it is named the ―Embryo Protection Act.‖  See id. at 1458. 
38
  A doctor might agree to implant more embryos than recommended because of the competition 
between the more than 400 fertility clinics in this country.  Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Fo-
cus on Fertility Clinics, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/12ivf.html?ref=health (link). 
39
  Ms. Suleman appears to have used a known donor to create her embryos.  There are complex is-
sues involved in regulating the donor world to assure protection of all involved.  See, e.g., Cahn, Acci-
dental Incest, supra note 31; Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National 
Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203 (2009).  
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B. New Ways to Regulate 
We support limits on the number of embryos transferred in any single 
ART procedure, although we would not impose limits on the number of 
embryos created in any cycle.  The risks posed to both patients and future 
children are too great, and the countervailing pressure for both doctors and 
patients to achieve a pregnancy too strong, to remain unaddressed.  The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) guidelines, devel-
oped by fertility practitioners, articulate the parameters of workable guide-
lines, and build in some flexibility to ensure that they are appropriately 
sensitive to the situation of each patient.  For example, consider the current 
ASRM guideline that no more than two embryos should be transferred into 
a patient under the age of 35 ―in the absence of extraordinary circums-
tances.‖40  A regulation that mirrors this directive leaves room for exemp-
tions—a thirty-four-year-old woman might be able to establish, for 
example, that due to a repeated history of unsuccessful attempts or poor 
embryo quality, she should be allowed to transfer three embryos on her last 
ART attempt.   
The need to reconcile generally binding guidelines with the potential 
for flexibility suggests that some sort of administrative agency may ulti-
mately be the best mechanism for ART regulation.  One possibility is to 
create an entity modeled on the British Human Fertilisation and Embryolo-
gy Authority, a board-directed governmental organization whose members 
include representatives from various stakeholding constituencies.41  A 
second is Professor Marsha Garrison‘s suggestion that we look toward a 
―quasi-public regulatory system,‖ like that in place in the organ transplant 
context.42  This quasi-public system could be responsible for reviewing ap-
peals from patients who believe they warrant exceptions from the guide-
lines.  Each of these alternatives involves creating a federal agency, which 
ensures that any new ART guidelines are national rather than state-based.  
This is critical, given the ease with which patients could travel between ju-





  See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., supra note 14, at S163. 
41
  See FAQs about the HFEA, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/127.html#6 (last visited Apr. 28, 2009) 
(link). 
42
  Garrison, supra note 25, at 1648.  A national transplant network was established in 1984 ―to be 
run by a private, nonprofit entity, that would maintain regional organ banks and set criteria for donation 
and receipt of organs.‖  Id. at 1648–49.  According to Garrison: 
Since 1986, the nongovernmental United Network for Organ Sharing (―UNOS‖) 
has contracted with the federal Department of Health and Human Services 
(―HHS‖) to run this network.  The UNOS Board of Directors, composed largely 
of transplant surgeons, establishes organ transplant policies, but these policies are 
not implemented until approved by the HHS Secretary.  Id. 
Even Garrison acknowledges that the UNOS approach is not perfect, but it seems to be a possible al-
ternative regulatory scheme.   
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could also implement enforcement mechanisms targeted at fertility clinics 
by imposing fines and handling de-accreditation proceedings. 
There are powerful objections to mandatory regulation.  As stated 
above, the higher risks for both mothers and children associated with mul-
tiple births provide the primary justification for exploring a new regulatory 
approach to ART, but it does not necessarily follow that federal government 
regulation is the best approach.  Perhaps we should instead respect the tradi-
tional sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship and rely upon physicians to 
self-regulate, or allow states to experiment with different types of regulation 
before establishing federal standards.  After all, we currently have a healthy 
tort system to bring medical malpractice claims, and, in addition to the in-
dustry‘s own organizations, there are state medical boards that could poten-
tially sanction their members (indeed, the California medical board is 
investigating Suleman‘s physician). 
Ultimately, however, we cannot rely on doctors who perform ART to 
self-regulate.  How can a doctor, who has treated a patient through repeat-
edly unsuccessful pregnancy attempts, be expected to resist a desperate plea 
to implant just one more embryo?43  Further, interference in the doctor-
patient relationship is hardly unprecedented.  Even if patients plead for 
them, doctors cannot legally prescribe medications that are not FDA-
approved; nor can doctors enroll patients in medical studies without com-
plying with informed consent guidelines.  It is clear, moreover, that volun-
tary guidelines have not workedstatistics from 2006, the most recent 
available, show that almost 4% of ART pregnancies involved three fetuses 
or more.44  In sum, when procedures are deemed sufficiently risky, govern-
ment regulation has traditionally intervened in the doctor-patient relation-
ship, and we believe the risks here are sufficiently great to allow that 
imposition.   
III. PROPOSALS REGARDING ACCESS 
Opening the door to any regulation potentially brings its own set of 
problems, including increasing financial pressures, inducing patients to tra-
vel, and, critically, inducing states to impose regulations on access to ART.  





  Estimates based on government reports are that less than 20% of fertility clinics comply with the 
voluntary guidelines restricting the number of embryos to be transferred into women under the age of 
35.  Stephanie Nano, Few Fertility Clinics Follow Embryo Guidelines, SFGATE.COM, Feb. 21, 2009, 
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A. Financial Considerations 
Although we advocate more regulation, we recognize the critical role 
of compassion for patients experiencing infertility.  Infertility is one of the 
most difficult life challenges an individual can encounter,45 and we believe 
we must do more to facilitate access to treatment.  Any new ART regula-
tions must therefore be coupled with increased insurance coverage.  Indeed, 
one of the reasons that individuals are willing to risk their own health and 
that of their future children by transferring a large number of embryos is 
because each individual IVF procedure is so expensive that a patient may 
only be able to afford one or at most two attempts.  If patients knew that in-
surance would cover multiple IVF attempts, the temptation to gamble on 
any single procedure would be greatly reduced. 
June Carbone and Paige Gottheim suggest another potential problem 
with regulation: imposing limits on embryo transfers might cause us to 
―lose[] control of the activity altogether‖ by driving women underground to 
black market fertility clinics or overseas to doctors who will comply with 
their treatment preferences.46  These are legitimate concerns, but our pro-
posal to increase insurance coverage will allay many of them.  Most women 
are not seeking to transfer five embryos because they want quintuplets; they 
are transferring five embryos because they want a successful pregnancy.  If 
women knew that multiple attempts with one or two embryos would be 
covered by insurance, they would feel less pressed to travel overseas or to 
engage in illegal fertility treatments.47 
B. Restrictions on Access 
Another powerful objection to regulation is the concern that opening 
the door to any kind of government interference in fertility treatments will 
also open the door to restrictions on ART access, issues that are surfacing in 
the wake of the Suleman case.48  We do not believe that any new govern-
ment regulations should include rules that restrict access to fertility treat-
ment by discriminating among potential patients.  Clinics should not screen 
on the basis of preexisting family size, the financial resources available to 
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orientation of potential patients.49  Individuals able to conceive without re-
productive technology are not subject to such restrictions before they ex-
pand their families.  Indeed, we are confident that any general attempt to 
impose limits on family size, such as China‘s one-child policy, would be 
greeted with horror by the American public.  For patients who are single or 
in a same-sex relationship, the state should not be in the position of barring 
access to parenthood.  There is simply no rational basis for doing so.50  Vir-
tually all states, for example, permit gay and lesbian parents to serve as fos-
ter parents and to adopt; allowing access to reproductive technology is 
entirely comparable. 
Commentators might respond that ART is more like adoption than nat-
ural childbirth, and that while restrictions on family size have no place in 
the nation‘s bedrooms, they do have a place in the nation‘s medical labs and 
fertility clinics.51  Margaret Somerville, for example, argues that adoption is 
the better comparison for ART because ―in both cases the resulting families 
are deliberately constructed with state assistance, rather than simply occur-
ring naturally.‖52  Similarly, Professor Garrison argues that the laws on 
adoption are an ―obvious source of policy guidance‖ for ART regulation.53 
These assumptions are questionable.  First, most families wrestling in 
silence with the challenge of infertility, paying for treatment out-of-pocket 
and unaided by insurance coverage, would surely question the view that 
their family‘s construction is a state struggle rather than a purely private 
one.  To the extent that the state provides ―assistance,‖ it provides similar 
help to any family involved with health care.  Families that conceive ―natu-
rally‖ benefit from ―state assistance‖ to research and medical facilities. 
―Natural parents‖ give birth in state-run hospitals and enjoy the fruits of 
government research on matters of prenatal and early childhood care no less 
than successful ART patients. 
More fundamentally, we think families created via ART are not, con-
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by adoption.  Instead, the better comparison is to families created without 
physician intervention.  Unlike ART, adoption is fundamentally concerned 
with actual children, not medical decisions.54  First, adoption inherently re-
quires legal determinations that are solely within the power of the state—to 
grant an adoption, the state must terminate, and then reassign, parental 
rights.  Second, adoptions increasingly involve the wishes of biological 
mothers.  Consider the significant involvement teenaged Juno had with the 
would-be adoptive parents of her baby in the 2007 eponymous movie, for 
example.55  Even when donors are involved in reproductive technology, that 
level of interaction between the parties is literally unheard-of.  Third, adop-
tion regulations necessarily focus on the best interests of a living child,56 
and it is appropriate to consider the best alternatives for that particular 
child.  In the ART context, we are obviously talking about potential child-
ren.  Restricting a patient‘s access, by definition, means that the future 
children in question will never be born.   
The possibility of regulation potentially raises complex morality-based 
issues concerning the scope of government control over families.  We be-
lieve the government should focus on regulating medical procedures, not 
family formation. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, we need to adopt regulations that support the fertility in-
dustry while also protecting the interests of patients, children, and the pub-
lic.  Artificial reproductive technology has provided enormous comfort to 
people who want children.  That does not mean, however, that we should 
not prevent doctors and their patients from creating instant families of 
eight-plus.  The risks to patients and their future children are simply too 
great to allow us to continue to rely upon purely voluntary guidelines that 
have been demonstrably unsuccessful.  At the same time, neither the state 
nor individual fertility clinics should be in the business of deciding which 
individuals are sufficiently ―fit‖ to receive fertility treatments.  Narrowly 
tailored regulation must be designed both to prevent abusive uses of ART 
procedures that endanger women and future children, and to ensure that pa-
tients themselves make the central decision of whether to become parents.  
Indeed, regulations are essential for the future of a vibrant and successful 
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